The Committee
1. The Minister of Communications, on behalf of the Government of Ghana (GoG),
established an inter-Ministerial Review Committee (the Committee) on the 18th of May,
2009 to provide the government with investigative analysis as well as findings,
conclusions and recommendations on numerous controversial issues surrounding the
privatization of Ghana Telecom (GT). The Committee was chaired by Mr. Justice
Emmanuel Akwei Addo, a retired Justice of Appeal, and made up of representatives of
the Ministries of Justice, Finance and Communications and the Office of the Auditor-
General. A Technical Team comprising communications, financial, and legal
consultants supported the Committee.
The Work of the Committee
2. The terms of reference of the Committee covered the examination of all the issues
relating to: the management and finances of GT from the tenure of TMP up until the
sale of 70% shares of GT to Vodafone; the terms and conditions of the Sales and
Purchase Agreement (SPA) entered into between the GoG and Vodafone International
Holdings BV (Vodafone) including the transfer of the national fibre optic; offer of a 3G
license; employee restructuring and labour rationalization programs of Vodafone;
safeguards for the minority shareholder; the Ghana Telecom University; and the
contract with the transaction advisors for the divestiture of GT. The work involved the
examination of documents and witnesses.
3. The former Minister of State for Finance, Dr. Akoto Osei refused to honour invitations
of the Committee. Mr. Oduro Nyaning, the immediate past CEO of GT could not
attend to the Committee’s call for information and explanations for personal reasons.
Findings of the Committee
The Committee made the following findings:
Constitutionality of the SPA and the Effect of Parliamentary Ratification
4. The Committee finds that Parliament acted unconstitutionally in purporting to ratify
an SPA that was not authorized by the President (Articles 75, 108, 181). This is because
the Constitution only allows Parliament to ratify agreements that have been entered
into by or on behalf of the President. This is a fundamental error that cannot be cured
by any internal procedures within Parliament. Parliament is subject to the Constitution
of Ghana and not above it. This makes the purported ratification of the SPA by
Parliament void and of no effect.
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Concerns of the SPA
5. The SPA may be open to serious Constitutional challenges on the grounds of illegality
and due process.
6. The relationship created by an Investor-State Contract is, to say the least, a legal
mixture and this also extends to the nature of disputes arising from them. First, the
parties enter into a contract over a subject matter uniquely classified as ‘Investment’ but
which, quite aside from theories; proceed from the commercial ambitions of the
Investor that interacts with the administrative responsibilities of the host state. We
have a natural or artificial legal person strike a deal with a sovereign entity. We have
two parties bound in principle by two sets of laws – Public International law on the
state side and then Private International laws on the International investor’s side. Yet
at the background lies an interested third party, the home state of the investor, who
needs to protect its citizen (the investor) and enhance repatriation of exported capital,
but who must equally respect the sovereignty of the contracting host state. These
issues generate conflicts.
7. Although strong allegations were made about bribery and corruption of the then
majority side of Parliament during the purported ratification of the SPA, the
Committee did not have the powers and resources to investigate these claims. The
Committee, therefore, refrains from making any findings on this specific allegation.
The Justification and Rationale for the Indemnity Clause in the SPA
8. The indemnity clause in the SPA is not balanced inasmuch as its purpose appears to be
solely to protect the interests of the buyer, and not the mutual interests of both parties.
It should be redrafted in a simpler form. Indemnities are important because they set
forth the way in which risks and liabilities will be shared between the parties, as
related to the main point in the contract. Stated another way, an indemnity clause sets
forth obligations of one person to secure or cover another person against an anticipated
loss, damage, or liability. These clauses, in effect, shift risk from one party to another.
Value for Money of the SPA
9. The Committee finds that GT was valued more by the Transaction Advisors and could
have fetched a price much higher than the SPA price of US $900 million (enterprise
value (EV) of US$1.286billion) for 70% of the Enlarged GT Group. Telecom S.A. offered
$947million (EV of US$1.635billion) for 66.67%. The Committee also finds that the
quoted price, through a series of complicated financial arrangements led GoG to
eventually realize only US$266.57 million from the SPA. The Committee finds that the
transaction was basically a sale of assets. All that the “cash free debt free” meant was
that the debts of GT were retired from the proceeds of the transaction and the available
cash. GoG did not get value for money from the sale.
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The National Fibre Optic Backbone
10. The Committee finds that the National Communications Backbone Company (NCBC)
that was included to create the enlarged GT group, was grossly under valued. This
value was determined solely on the costs of the stated value from the Volta River
Authority (VRA) for the VoltaCom fiber assets and the US$30million Chinese Exim
Bank concessionary loan. The value of the National Fiber Backbone Company should
have been determined based on the synergies of creating a high performance service
delivery platform with nationwide reach, with revenue and annual profit potential far
in excess of the total assessed asset value. In any case, the Committee finds that the
Fibre Optic Network is a strategic national asset and should have remained an
independently operated infrastructure as originally intended and must not be sold to a
private investor with a solely commercial agenda.
Ghana Telecom University
11. The Government should take steps to decouple the Ghana Telecom University from
Vodafone GT without delay.
Other Findings
Management of GT before the Sale
12. The Committee finds that the appalling financial state of GT before the sale was due to
the fact that the Telenor/Telecom Management Partners (TMP) and the 3 member
Interim Management Team of GT grossly mismanaged GT by indulging in or allowing
all sorts of financial malpractices and irregularities. They plundered the company into
crippling debt, and to the point of insolvency.
Executive Interference in the GT Sale
13. The former President Mr. J. A Kufuor held at least one meeting alone with Vodafone
Executives in London and a second meeting with the Vodafone Executives also in
London and this time with his Secretary present. Mr Kufuor also on several occasions
in Ghana and with some of his Ministers (Ministers of Communications, Finance and
the Chief of Staff) present, held meetings with Vodafone to negotiate and agree the
transaction consideration and the underlying assumptions of the Vodafone offer. This
was done without expert advice.
14. The Committee heard testimony that the former President subsequently agreed on the
transaction price, technical considerations and the underlying legal assumptions of the
Vodafone offer contained in their offer letter dated 15th May 2008. The offer letter was
then signed by Dr. Akoto Osei, Minister of State of the Ministry of Finance and
Economic Planning (MOFEP), instead of the substantive Minister. This was within 24
hours of presentation of the Vodafone bid and granted exclusivity to Vodafone.
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15. The process undertaken by the former President was highly irregular and
unconventional and did not rely on expert advice.
The US$228 million Shareholder Loans/US$63 million Escrow
16. Advisors of Government and Vodafone (Boulders and PWC) have already presented
expenditure statements covering the US228 million and also claiming up to about
US$45 million from the US$63 million Escrow. Charges against the Escrow include
increases in provision for bad debts and exchange differences arising from delayed
updates of Vodafone records with GoG assumed debts. This does not appear to be a
valid claim. The Interim Management Committee (IMC) should have also advised
against payments such as for the US$1.9 million made to the TMP in 2008 because they
know that TMP had illegally paid monies to itself long before the GT sale.
Termination of the Transaction Advisors
17. In December 2007 the TAs Contract was not renewed nor extended and they were not
used in subsequent Vodafone negotiations. Fixed fee payments due them remain
outstanding and a success fee claim for US$1.5m had been negotiated with the former
Chief of Staff as of December 2008.
The US$200 million Bridge Facility
18. Vodafone could not provide the required information to enable the Committee confirm
the expected US$200 million capital injected into GT post the SPA even after several
requests had been made of them. They informed the Committee that they had made
several payments since August 2008 and had drawn about US$187 million from the
bridge facility as at May 2009. The payments list provided the Committee included
payments to Huawei amounting to GH¢61million between August 2008 and May 2009.
On request for confirmation, Huawei submitted documents indicating that they had
invoiced and received only GH¢37.29million and not the Ghc61million that Vodafone
alleged they had paid them. The Government may wish to confront them with this
matter and ask them to account for the difference of GH¢23.71m. This matter can be
used as a bargaining chip for Vodafone to back down on the renegotiation.
RECOMMENDATIONS
19. Negotiation of the SPA
The Committee recommends that:
(i) The unconstitutionality of the purported ratification of the SPA by Parliament
should be brought to the attention of Vodafone without delay.
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(ii) GoG should consider requesting Vodafone to renegotiate the SPA and in
particular, a reconsideration of the following:
a. Parties to the SPA
b. The compliance or otherwise of the SPA with the laws of Ghana, particularly
the NCA Regulations and the Internal Revenue Act 592.
c. Value for money/Transaction Consideration.
d. The retention of the National Fibre Optic by GoG as a strategic national
asset.
e. Decoupling of the Ghana Telecom University from the transaction (already
done).
f. Return of GT investments to GoG such as the Telecom Emporium.
(iii) The SPA was negotiated in an inelegant manner by GoG. GoG gave everything
and took nothing in the context of the inequalities in bargaining power that were
allowed to prevail. This should never be allowed to happen again in this country.
(iv) Ghana has access to some of the world’s best experts in every field and those
human resources should be engaged and deployed in aid of negotiations such as
the SPA in order to safeguard the national interest.
20. Future Negotiations/Agreements Entered into by GoG
The Committee recommends that:
(i) GoG conducts a serious audit into the way and manner it negotiates such business
deals.
(ii) A working party of experts, consisting of a corps of technical experts and
negotiators, should be in charge of such negotiations.
(iii) Copies of all GoG Agreements should be lodged with Government Archivists as
required by law. Copies of such Agreements should be lodged with the
Attorney-General (AG) as the second repository and copies retained by the
respective MDAs who should superintend the execution and implementation of
the respective public agreements to ensure that the best interests of Ghana are
protected.
21. NCBC
The NCBC must be decoupled from the enlarged GT Group and a public entity
established with a nationalistic mandate and given the resources to complete and
expand the backbone to all socially and economically necessary locations to enable it
act as the foundation for GoG’s ICT Policy.
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22. Management of GT before the Sale
The Committee recommends:
That a forensic audit be conducted into the affairs of GT to cover the TMP and the
Interim Management era. The former Interim Management Committee and relevant
Board Members must be compelled to provide the information necessary to
understand and assess the management and finances of GT during those periods.
23. Post the SPA
(i) Other post SPA issues, such as the determination of closing working capital and
Net debt adjustments, should be finalized with negotiations and following
detailed audits and reviews of those payments being claimed. The short term
reviews, as have been implemented by GoG so far, do not provide enough
information to enable confirmation of payments claimed on the escrows nor of
the injection of capital by Vodafone. Forensic reviews into these specific issues
are required.
(ii) Detailed reporting requirements based on forensic accounting and reporting
principles should be requested by GoG of GT-Vodafone, following the
establishment of actual sourcing and use of funds purportedly introduced by
current management as working capital.
CONCLUSION
24. The purported ratification of the SPA by parliament was unconstitutional as it violated
due process provisions of the Constitution and other laws of Ghana; it disrespects the
sovereignty of Ghana by tying GoG’s hands in many unacceptable ways; it is illegal in
several respects; and it does not constitute a transaction that provided value for
money. The purported ratification by Parliament is therefore void and the SPA should
be renegotiated by GoG. The TMP and IMC tenure should be audited and
management at the time made to answer for their stewardship.
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